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Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979:
Revamping the U.S. Trade Machinery
The United States is no longer the successful competitor it once
was in the international marketplace.I During the last decade, concern
has grown in both the national and international communities about
the way in which United States trade policy is formulated and imple-
mented. This concern has resulted in a reorganized and strengthened
U.S. trade machinery. Briefly, the Carter Administration's new Reor-
ganization Plan No. 3 of 19792 has placed the responsibility for the
negotiation of foreign trade matters and for the formulation of trade
policy in the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR),
and has called upon the Department of Commerce to implement these
trade policies.'
This comment will discuss the factors leading to the promulgation
of the Administration's Plan, outline the Plan itself, and examine its
potential for success. It should be noted that the Plan is expected to
continue in its dynamic state until well after publication of this article.
Overall, the Plan can be expected to afford U.S. trade matters the
visibility and attention they deserve, placing the previously diffuse
trade functions under more centralized authority. In this way, the
United States presumably can regain its position as a viable competitor
in the international marketplace.
BACKGROUND
From 1968 to 1978, United States exports more than quadrupled,
reaching $143 billion in 1978, 4 accounting for about six percent of the
1 See INDUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT No.
79-22, 3 (1979). See also Reorganizing the Government's International Trade and Investment Func-
tions: Hearings on S.377, S.891, S.937, S.1471, S.1493, and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979
before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (statement of
Robert C. Byrd) [hereinafter cited as Reorganization Hearings].
2 HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REORG. PLAN No. 3 OF 1979, H.R. Doc.
No. 96-193, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprintedin 44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (1979).
3 Id.
4 I14DUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN. supra note 1, at 3.
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gross national product.5 These exports represent about sixteen percent
of everything grown, mined, or manufactured in this country,6 and it is
estimated that their production supports some 4.3 million American
jobs.7 However, despite this seemingly sizeable export figure, the U.S.
share of world trade, excluding world exports to the U.S., has dropped
from eighteen percent in 1970 to fourteen percent in 1978.8
During the 1970's, the favorable balance of payments which had
been enjoyed by the United States for well over two decades was re-
placed by a mounting balance of payments deficit. The deficit first sur-
faced in the early 1970's 9 and surpassed $28 billion in 1978,10 a




Until now, the United States was the only major industrialized na-
tion that lacked a centralized body with clear responsibility to formu-
late and implement foreign trade policy. Instead, this responsibility
was scattered among perhaps a dozen different government agencies.1
2
This decentralized system merely reflected the low governmental prior-
ity given to U.S. foreign policy development and coordination and to
the expansion of export opportunities abroad.
This lethargic posture was, to a large extent, mirrored in the pri-
vate sector where most U.S. businesses found little incentive for intro-
ducing their products overseas when the domestic market was so
accessible and lucrative. United States producers, however, gradually
found their once thought inexhaustible domestic market eroded by
strong foreign competition. Many of the foreign products were manu-
factured with the help of subsidies from their respective governments,
5 INDUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INDICA-
TORS No. 4, 36 (1979).
6 Id.
7 Proposed Foreign Trade Reorganization." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and
National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (Aug. 1
and Sept. 10, 1979) (statement of Frank Horton) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Trade Hearings].
8 INDUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN., supra note 5, at 33.
9 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 3
OF 1979, S. REP. No. 402, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REORGANIZATION
PLAN REPORT].
10 INDUSTRY & TRADE ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3.
11 Reorganization Hearings, supra note 1, at 3.
12 As a recent Library of Congress study reported:
Six agencies have offices primarily concerned with trade policy; three agencies have primary
concern for export promotion efforts; four agencies have primary responsibility for adminis-
tering the laws which pertain to the impact of trade on the U.S. economy; five agencies have
divisions or offices performing international trade research and analysis; one agency has ma-
jor responsibility for export controls; and three agencies perform significant statistical work.
Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Frank Horton).
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and other items were sold in this country at prices below those charged
for similar domestic goods, both in violation of U.S. international un-
fair competition laws. 13 The statutory redress provided to domestic
business by the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Acts proved
largely ineffective because the Department of Treasury, responsible for
the enforcement of these statutes against unfair trade practices by for-
eign competitors, seemed lax in its duties, often failing to collect an-
tidumping duties already imposed.
14
Those United States companies willing to export goods to foreign
countries often found that non-tariff trade barriers and various other
restrictions imposed by foreign governments frequently made such
transactions unattractive or unavailable. These companies also faced
complex trade promotion and finance programs sponsored by numer-
ous government agencies.15 Small and medium-sized businesses were
especially troubled by their lack of personnel and financial resources
necessary to avail themselves of these government-backed opportuni-
ties for export. 1
6
In response to its debilitated trade position, the United States has
participated in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), and recently
signed the resultant agreements which seek the reduction of non-tariff
trade barriers. 7 The public and private sectors now look to the imple-
mentation of the MTN agreements for the opening of new markets to
U.S. business, labor, and agriculture. The MTN codes on government
procurement, subsidies, civil aircraft, import licensing, standards, and
customs valuation seek to assure fair international trade practices and
strengthen the export performance of U.S. industry. I
The Carter Administration has recognized the concomitant need
for a revitalized and centralized U.S. trade machinery capable of ap-
plying the MTN codes domestically and developing procedures for ag-
gressive monitoring and enforcement both at home and abroad. 19 On
September 25, 1979, the President transmitted to Congress a trade reor-
13 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, .upra note 9, at 12.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 10-11.
16 Such recent, government-created incentives to increase exports as the Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation, I.R.C. § 911, the Export-Import Bank, 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1976), and
others, have augmented earlier attempts in the form of the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C.§§ 61-66 (1976), and the Edge Act of 1919, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1970).
17 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS AcT OF 1979,
H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TRADE AGREEMENTS RE-
PORT].
18 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 49.
19 Reorganization Hearings, supra note 1, at 13-14 (statement of James T. McIntyre, Jr.).
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ganization plan which became law November 29, 1979, and went into
effect on January 2, 1980.20 This timing was important since it allowed
the plan to implement the MTN agreements which shared the January
2 effective date.2'
The need for a reorganization and consolidation of U.S. foreign
trade functions was also perceived by Congress and industry, as both
had been working on reorganization projects or proposals for several
years. Private sector proposals came from such groups as the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Business Round Table, and the
American League for Exports and Security Assistance, Inc.2 2 Gener-
ally, these groups sought a consolidation of the disparate authorities
under one agency, with a clear mandate to develop an affirmative ex-
port policy.
Some of these suggestions were incorporated in congressional pro-
posals for trade reorganization. These bills encompassed a wide range
of plans, from those seeking the creation of a new Department of Inter-
national Trade and Investment2 3 to those recommending the transfer of
all trade functions to a newly named Department of Trade and Com-
merce.24 There were also those seeking a middle ground, proposing a
20 See REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 49; Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed.
Reg. 989 (1980).
21 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1977), dealing with Executive Reorganization, states:
A reorganization plan is effective at the end of the first period of sixty calendar days of con-
tinuous session of Congress after the date on which the plan is transmitted to it unless, be-
tween the date of transmittal and the end of the sixty-day period, either House passes a
resolution stating in substance that the House does not favor the reorganization plan.
A disapproval resolution in the House of Representatives was defeated on November 8, 1979.
H.R. Res. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Ruc. H10,421 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1979). There was
no vote taken by the full Senate, although the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee voted 16-0
to report the resolution of disapproval unfavorably. S. Res. 245, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). On
December 4, the full Senate indefinitely postponed consideration of the resolution. 125 CONG.
REc. S17,759 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979).
22 See, e.g., Export Policy: The Needfor Trade Reorganization: Hearings Be/ore the Subcommt
on Int'l Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 2, 1979) (author's
copy of statement by Robert A. Best, Executive Vice President, American League for Exports and
Security Assistance, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Export Policy Hearings].
23 This concept originated in S. 77, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 1261 (daily ed. Feb.
7, 1979), sponsored by Senators William V. Roth and Abraham Ribicoff. Briefly, the bill would
have established a new Department of International Trade and Investment. Its responsibilities
would have included coordinating U.S. policies for international trade, negotiating trade agree-
ments, protecting domestic industry, labor and agriculture from unfair foreign competition, and
seeking and promoting new trade and commercial opportunities for U.S. exporters. The Senators
would have made the new Department Secretary responsible for both MTN implementation and
new negotiations.
24 This Department serves as the core of H.R.4567, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), sponsored by
Representatives James R. Jones and Bill Frenzel. The Department would have had primary re-
sponsibility for the formulation and implementation of export promotion policies, the implemen-
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Cabinet-level Special Trade Agency, headed by the Special Trade Rep-
resentative (STR),25 and a Trade Coordinating Council, both located
within the executive branch.26
The Administration, after considering these and other proposals,
submitted the Plan which appears to be a compromise, seen by many in
both the public and private sectors as easing this country into a more
competitive position in the international marketplace. The statutory
impetus for the Administration's Plan is found in section 1109 of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,27 which called for the President to sub-
mit to Congress by early July 1979 a proposal to restructure the execu-
tive branch's foreign trade policy-making and regulatory functions.28
The provision requested the President to consider the development of a
strengthened STR, and a monitoring and enforcement structure ensur-
ing protection of U.S. rights under the MTN agreements.29 Congress
anticipated that the President's proposal would result in improved per-
formance of commercial attaches and programs overseas, assuring that
the other MTN signatory countries would fulfill their trade agreement
tation and enforcement of the MTN agreements, and the development of long-term planning on
matters of international trade. Their bill also would have transferred both the Export-Import
Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to the new Department. Finally, the Spe-
cial Trade Representative would have remained in the Executive Office of the President and
would have directed U.S. negotiations in bilateral and multilateral trade talks encompassing East-
West trade and commodity agreements. The Trade Representative would also have served as the
chairman of the Trade Policy Committee, the interagency executive committee involved in the
development and coordination of trade policy.
25 The phrase Special Trade Representative (STR) hereinafter will be used synonomously
with the Plan's new title for this position, United States Trade Representative (USTR).
26 This proposal was the substance of H.R. 4995, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), sponsored by
Representative Gillis W. Long. The bill would have retained Cabinet-level status for the STR,
made him the chief officer for both trade policy development and coordination, further expanded
his duties to include enforcement of the MTN agreements against unfair trade practices, and as-
signed full responsibility for all trade negotiations to him. It also would have transferred substan-
tial trade authority from the Departments of State and Treasury, while leaving intact those trade
functions currently in the International Trade Commission and the Department of Agriculture.
Id. at § 403. Finally, the Department of Commerce, although losing its responsibility for develop-
ing export policy to the new Special Trade Agency, would have gained functional authority, trans-
ferred from the Department of State, over the foreign commercial attaches. Id. at § 404.
27 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 314 (1979). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, signed into
law July 26, 1979, approved and implemented the trade agreements negotiated by the U.S. in the
recently concluded Tokyo Round of the MTN and submitted to Congress by the President on
June 19, 1979.
28 Id. The Office of Management and Budget had been studying reorganization proposals
prior to this Act and had completed a report entitled a "Review of the Economic Analysis and
Policy Machinery of the Federal Government." 42 Fed. Reg. 43,375 (1977). This study entailed
consultation with Congress and industry, and served as the basis for the later reorganization plan
drafted by the Administration.
29 TRADE AGREEMENTS REPORT, .supra note 17, at 196.




In his message to Congress upon the transmittal of his Plan, Presi-
dent Carter expressed high hopes for the success of his proposal, view-
.ing it as one which would "sharpen and unify trade policy direction,
improve the efficiency of trade law enforcement, and enable us to nego-
tiate abroad from a position of strength."'31 The Plan was also said to
seek improvement in U.S. export promotion activities so that American
exporters would have increased access to and success in overseas mar-
kets. 3 2
The United States Trade Representative
The Plan clearly calls for the STR-to be renamed the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR)--to serve as the chief
trade advisor to the President, responsible for negotiating and coordi-
nating all U.S. international trade and direct investment policy as well
as for overseeing the implementation of the MTN agreements. 33 The
USTR will remain within the Executive Office of the President (EOP),
and will be advised by the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) which the
STR will chair.34 The USTR will have further responsibility in the
following areas:
Import remedies. The USTR will oversee the application of im-
port remedies, recommending any necessary legislative changes.3 It
will also coordinate antidumping and countervailing duty matters in an
30 Id. The Administration issued a discussion draft of a reorganization proposal in late July,
and opportunities were made available for reactions and suggestions from Congress and the pri-
vate sector. While this draft was ambiguous with respect to where trade policy was actually to be
formulated, the Administration's final Plan, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, incorporated
many of the proposals of both sectors and remedied the earlier lack of specificity. The Plan was
transmitted to Congress on September 25, 1979.
31 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 54.
32 Reorganization Plan No. 3 0f1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and Na-
tional Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (Oct. 16,
1979) (author's copy of statement by James T. McIntyre, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as McIntyre State-
ment].
33 McIntyre Statement, note 32 supra.
34 The STR is a Congressional creation, implemented during the Kennedy administration.
The post was created pursuant to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Exec. Order No. 11,075
(1963), refprintedin 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1965). The STR chaired the forerunner to the present TPC,
the Interagency Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee. The STR, pursuant to the Trade Act
of 1974, was elevated to Cabinet rank, and given responsibility for implementing certain domestic
laws regulating imports. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1976). The present TPC, also pursuant to the Trade
Act of 1974, replaced the prior interagency committee. 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1976).
35 McIntyre Statement, note 32 supra.
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attempt to establish new precedents, negotiate assurances and settle-
ments, and coordinate these with other trade matters.36
East-West trade policy. The USTR will have primary responsi-
bility for East-West trade negotiations, and will coordinate East-West
trade policy.3 7 The East-West Foreign Trade Board will be abolished,
with its functions transferred to the TPC.38
International investment policy. The USTR will also have pri-
mary responsibility for international direct investment policy issues
where they relate to international trade.39 Such issues will include mat-
ters of direct foreign investment in the U.S., direct investment by
Americans overseas, operations of multinational enterprises, and multi-
lateral agreements on international investment.1° He will serve ex of-
ficio as a nonvoting member of the board of directors of the Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank)-a role also assigned to the Secretary of
Commerce-and as a voting member and Vice Chair of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).41 The Executive Order imple-
menting the Plan makes the STR a member of the National Advisory
Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies (NAC),
which is involved with the policies of Eximbank.42 The Secretary of
Commerce is already a member.
International commodity policy. The USTR will be responsible
for the negotiation and coordination of commodity issues.43 He will
work closely with the Departments of State and Agriculture, and the
International Development Cooperation Agency on those trade and
commodity issues before the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).4
Energy trade. The USTR will also coordinate trade-related en-
ergy matters, with the Department of Energy becoming an ad hoc
member of the TPC.45 The Department of Energy will continue to








42 Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989, 991 (1980).
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Export-expansionpolicy. The USTR will have policy oversight of
U.S. export activities, seeking a favorable framework for their contin-
ued expansion to foreign markets.4 7
Negotiations. In his role as chief negotiator, the Trade Represen-
tative is expected to delegate his responsibility to those government
agencies with the appropriate expertise on a particular trade issue. 8
He will coordinate the operational aspects of these negotiations by
chairing a Trade Negotiating Committee consisting of representatives
from the Departments of Commerce, State, Agriculture, Treasury and
Labor.4 9
Overseas implementation of MTN. The USTR will have a small
permanent staff in Geneva, under the on-site direction of one of the
Trade Representative's Deputy USTRs50 This staff will represent the
United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the pri-
mary forum for interpreting and implementing the MTN agreements,
and one requiring continuous committee and working group meet-
ings.5
1
The Department of Commerce
In an effort to centralize the various trade functions once scattered
among many different agencies, the Plan calls for the Department of
Commerce to be in charge of the operational responsibilities in the
non-agricultural trade area, its primary mission being to promote the
international competitiveness of U.S. industry.52 The Department will
also be involved with foreign commercial representation, the adminis-
tration of countervailing and antidumping duties,53 and MTN imple-
mentation. These new responsibilities are an expansion of the
Department's present functions which include export promotion, ex-
port controls, East-West trade, trade adjustment assistance to firms and
communities, trade policy analysis, and monitoring of foreign compli-
ance with trade agreements. 4 Finally, all these trade functions will be
internally reorganized under a new Under Secretary for International
Trade.5
Commercial representation. A new Assistant Secretary for Export
47 Id.
48 Id.








International Law & Business 2:224(1980)
Development will administer both domestic and overseas promotion
activities.56 This merger of functions under one authority is expected to
improve greatly the dissemination of information about export oppor-
tunities abroad to firms in the United States.57 The commercial at-
taches will be able to respond better to U.S. exporters' needs because
the standards and guidelines governing the former's actions will now be
established by the same department that is in close contact with the
problems of domestic business.58 Roughly 160 people, mostly commer-
cial attaches stationed overseas, will be transferred from the Depart-
ment of State to a new Foreign Commercial Service in the Department
of Commerce.59
Import remedies. The Department of Commerce will have the
authority to accept assurances and settle antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases, while the STR will be responsible for any prior ne-
gotiations in this area.60 This function will be administered by a new
Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration.6
MTN implementation. A new Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Economic Policy will manage this function, supervising an en-
larged staff that earlier had worked closely with the STR during the
MTN negotiations.6" It is hoped that assigning this responsibility to
such a group will lead to the aggressive, efficient, and effective monitor-
ing and implementation of the MTN agreements.
Among the duties of this group will be: (1) operating a Trade
Complaint Center where members of the private sector will be able to
obtain advice and information about available recourses and remedies;
(2) providing U.S. business with basic information on the various for-
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
59 Id. The commercial transfer will become effective April 1, 1980.
60 McIntyre Statement, note 32 supra. Enforcement of the countervailing duty statute requires
the Department of Commerce to investigate whether a grant or bounty was made by a country to
its producer. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 151-62 (1979). If so, the International Trade Commission
must then determine whether U.S. industry is injured thereby. Id. Should the ITC make an af-
firmative finding, a settlement may be negotiated between the parties by the STR, or Commerce
may a duty which the Customs officials in the Department of Treasury shall collect. Id.
A similar procedure exists for the enforcement of the antidumping statute. Pub. L. No. 96-39,
93 Stat. 162-73 (1979). These two procedures are discussed more fully in TRADE AGREEMENTS
REPORT, supra note 17, at 45-71.
61 McIntyre Statement note 32 supra. The Plan transfers 219 persons to the Department of
Commerce to handle the enforcement of the antidumping and countervailing duties. Of these, 130
will be newly created positions, with the balance coming from the Department of Treasury. Tele-
phone conversation with Eric Hirschhorn, Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs and
Trade Organization, the Office of Management and Budget (Dec. 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Hirschhorn Conversation].
62 McIntyre Statement, note 32 supra.
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eign trade laws, regulations and procedures; and (3) identifying prob-
lem areas for the STR and TPC to examine further.6 3
Underlying Rationale
First among the rationales for the Plan was the need for the trade
structure to address itself to the close relationship between the U.S.
trade position and numerous domestic policies--economic, energy-re-
lated, and regulatory, among others-that impinge on industry compet-
itiveness. Accordingly, the Plan requires the Department of Commerce
to perform an industry and service sector analysis which will give the
Department the lead role in establishing a link to trade policy and pro-
motion.64
Second, the Plan had to reflect the principle that trade is a valid
concern of agencies that have major responsibility for what are some-
times conflicting national policies and objectives.65 Trade is an impor-
tant element in U.S. foreign relations and requires the active
involvement of the Department of State. Similarly, trade is closely
connected with international monetary matters, and necessitates the
participation of the Department of Treasury.66
James T. McIntyre, primary draftsman of the Administration's
Plan, believes that the new trade structure will accommodate these di-
verse and legitimate interests. It is expected that through the STR's
direction as chairman of the Trade Policy Committee, these interests
will be shaped into a balanced and rational trade policy.67 The Admin-
istration places great emphasis on the role the STR will play as an
"honest" or "neutral" broker, capable of resolving these trade policy
issues.6 8 Finally, the Administration, concerned with keeping down the
size of the Office of the USTR, believes that the operational trade func-
tions will best be managed by those departments, primarily the Depart-
ment of Commerce, outside the Executive Office.69 These agencies are
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Separation of Policy Development from Policy Implementation
Perhaps the strongest overall criticism of the Plan is that it retains,
to a large extent, the fragmented character of U.S. foreign trade policy.
The Plan draws a line between the responsibilities of policy develop-
ment and implementation, placing the former with the USTR and the
latter with the Department of Commerce. Congressional critics have
cited this schism as artificial and illogical.7" Policy and implementa-
tion, in other words, are inseparable. Policy cannot be formulated in a
vacuum, and operations, particularly now that the MTN agreements
are in effect, must not be allowed to frustrate or determine policy."
This point was developed by William N. Walker, former Deputy
STR, who noted that countervailing duty and antidumping proceedings
involve important trade policy implications.73 The Plan's separation of
policy from operations would likely lead to inefficiency and lack of co-
ordination.74
Export finance is another area in which this structural problem
arises. The STR's nonvoting membership on Eximbank's board of di-
rectors has been described as a "big hole" in the Plan since it gives the
STR uncertain influence.7" International finance is linked to interna-
tional trade and negotiations, yet the STR may not have Eximbank's
mandate when he enters into negotiations involving matters of export
finance. Harold Malmgren, another former Deputy STR, believes that
the STR should have authority over the policy of Eximbank, a role
71 Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 129 (statement of William V. Roth).
72 Id.
73 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. 6, 1979) (author's copy of testimony by William N. Walker) [hereinafter
cited as Walker Testimony]. Mr. Walker, a partner in a New York City law firm, is a specialist in
matters of international trade. He delivered testimony in his capacity as Vice Chairman of the
Commercial Policy Committee, U.S. Council, International Chamber of Commerce.
74 Id. Mr. Walker provided examples in support of his view, one of which involved the Treas-
ury Department. In late 1975 the Department, then responsible for administering the counter-
vailing and antidumping statutes, dismissed a substantial antidumping case involving automobiles
imported to this country from Japan and Europe. The Treasury Department's decision to dismiss
was made without consultation with the STR. No quid pro quo was requested or received despite
active efforts by both the Japanese and the European Community to dismiss the case and both
could have been expected to make certain concessions in other areas of negotiation handled by
STR. As seen by Mr. Walker, this example emphasizes the STR's weakened negotiating position
when operational authority-in this case, for antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings-
is assigned to another agency. Id.
75 Telephone conversation with Harry Lamar, Staff Director of the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means (Dec. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Lamar Conversation].
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precluded or weakened by STR's nonvoting status.76 Malmgren fur-
ther sees a need for Eximbank policy to be consistent and coordinated
with the other trade policy areas such as the STR's negotiations with
China, the Soviet Union, and lesser developed countries, and the subse-
quent need for all matters of foreign trade to be consolidated under one
authority.77
The Administration's responses to the criticisms of the Plan have
been vigorous and not without merit. The decision to separate policy
coordination and negotiation from operation and implementation was
prompted by at least two considerations.
First, as noted earlier,78 the separation between policy and imple-
mentation was believed necessary for STR's retention of its role as an
"honest" broker. Essentially, the Plan's drafters recognized that other
departments would continue to have trade or commerce-related re-
sponsibilities which might conflict with one another, and require a neu-
tral authority within the Executive Office of the President which could
resolve them.79
Second, the Plan's drafters recognized a clear need for the Office of
the USTR to continue to be located within the EOP.80 This proximity
to the President is expected to reinforce the support given to the STR
by the Chief Executive, and constitute a significant element of the
STR's power to shape U.S. foreign trade."' Such explicit support is
found in section 1 of the Plan, dealing with the scope of the USTR's
new role: "The Trade Representative shall serve as theprinc#7al advi-
sor to the President on international trade policy. . .[and] shall have
lead responsibility for the conduct of international trade negotia-
tions.""2
76 Telephone conversation with Harald Malmgren, former Deputy Special Trade Representa-
tive (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Malmgren Conversation]. Mr. Malmgren presently heads
his own private consulting firm in international business matters.
77 Id.
78 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
79 Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 37 (statement of James T. McIntyre).
80 McIntyre Statement, note 32 supra.
81 Id. The direct and immediate access to the President is expected to increase STR's prestige
and authority both at home and abroad. A recent report prepared by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs addressed this point in the context of the STR as chief negotiator. It stated:
Foreign countries will know that the U.S. Trade Representative enjoys the authority to make
good on any representations he may make in a broad range of areas. They will know that he
will be the primary individual with whom they must deal on a broad range of issues. No
longer will foreign negotiators be able to take advantage of any differences between U.S.
agencies, or the failure of the U.S. agency in one negotiation to know about negotiations on
another related trade issue led by a different U.S. agency.
REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 17.
82 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, §§ l(b)(1), 1(b)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Perhaps more important is the informal influence the STR has by
virtue of the good relations he and his office share with the Department
of Commerce. Commerce, along with the Department of Agriculture,
played a critical role in the MTN negotiations, performing much of the
staffwork on the government procurement, tariff, and commodities is-
sues.83 Commerce also operated the industry sector advisory commit-
tees which were the key private sector groups impacting on STR
objectives in the negotiations and generating widespread congressional
support for the negotiated package.84 One can therefore expect that the
open lines of communication and good working relationship which
have existed between the two agencies will continue in the post-MTN
period.
Congressional criticism of STR's nonvoting status on Eximbank's
board of directors may be answered by noting that the decision to deny
the STR full membership and voting power was based on practical
considerations. The added personnel and financial resources necessary
for the STR to assume a voting role were considered unwarranted,
since Eximbank's activities encompass many non-trade matters, such as
national security and foreign policy. These issues would not necessitate
the STR's direct involvement. It is fairly clear that the new presence of
both the STR and the Secretary of Commerce on the Bank's board will
provide adequate input into an area previously less accessible to them.
These two officials can be expected to have the opportunity to discuss
the relevant trade issues, present their views from the perspective of
overall trade policy, and thereby influence the board's decisions.8 5
As for his role on OPIC, the newly appointed USTR has expressed
his commitment to active membership in the Corporation, recognizing
the direct relationship of OPIC's programs to the Administration's ef-
forts to increase U.S. exports.86 The same recognition has been ex-
83 Telephone conversation with Richard Heimlich, Ass't U.S. Trade Representative for Indus-
trial Trade Policy, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 28, 1979).
84 Id.
85 A second reason for the Administration's decision to leave the Eximbank independent of
the USTR was the Bank's strong popularity among those in government, industry and banking for
its successful performance over the past several years under its director, John Moore. Its respon-
sive and liberal credit policies made the Administration wary of tampering with an effective oper-
ation. Telephone conversation with John C.L. Donaldson, Ass't U.S. Trade Representative for
Congressional and Public Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Nov. 20, 1979) [herein-
after cited as Donaldson Conversation]. This view was neatly summarized by a comment reput-
edly made by former OMB Director, Bert Lance, who quipped: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." Id.
86 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 63 (letter from Reubin Askew to Abra-
ham Ribicoff, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs) (Oct. 29, 1979).
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pressed by the chairman of OPIC. 7
Inability to Coordinate and Oversee Interagency Policy-Making
Concern has been voiced about the STR's lack of line authority
over those implementing its policies.88 Each agency has its own De-
partment Secretary whose subordinates are answerable only to him and
who may be over-protective of his own prerogatives.8 9 Critics point to
the potential friction on the interagency Trade Policy Committee as the
STR attempts to coordinate trade policy development and its subse-
quent implementation.
The Administration rejects the view that STR's lack of line author-
ity over the agencies composing the TPC will undermine the STR's
policy coordination and oversight role." The Plan addresses this point
specifically:
(3) To the extent necessary to assure the coordination of international
trade policy ... the Trade Representative, with the advice of the Com-
mittee [TPC], shall issue policy guidance to departments and agencies on
basic issues of policy and interpretation arising in the exercise of the fol-
lowing international trade functions. Such guidance shall determine the
policy of the United States with respect to international trade issues arising
in the exercise o/such functions .... 9'
The President further stressed the STR's lead role in chairing the
TPC and developing and coordinating trade policy. In his transmittal
of the Plan to Congress, he described more fully the USTR's new func-
tions:
[T]he Trade Representative will act as theprincipal trade spokesman of the
President. To assure that our trade policies take into account the broadest
range of perspectives, the Trade Representative will consult with the Trade
Policy Committee, whose mandate and membership will be expanded.
... When different departmental views on trade matters exist within the
TPC as will be the case from time to time in this complex policy area, I
will expect the Trade Representative to resolve policy disagreements in his
best judgment, subject to appeal to the President.9 2
It is clear, therefore, that the STR will be the authority on trade
matters. His statutory and Presidential support can be expected to en-
sure his success in his new trade role in general, and in his leadership of
87 Id. at 64 (letter from Thomas Ehrlich to Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs) (Oct. 29, 1979).
88 Telephone conversation with Dr. Charles Morrison, Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator
William V. Roth (Nov. 19, 1979).
89 Id.
90 Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 37.
91 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 1(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 69273 (1979).
92 REORGANIZATION PLAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 51-52.
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the TPC in particular. As one official in the Office of the USTR ex-
plained, there will be few instances of major disagreement between the
STR and the other agencies, since it would require them to appeal di-
rectly to the President for the problem's resolution, and, he noted:
"You can go to the well only so many times."93
The TPC's advisory role in multilateral trade negotiations and cer-
tain other trade issues is now expanded to include the areas of interna-
tional investment poliCy,94 international commodity negotiations,95
energy trade issues,96 East-West trade policy,97 and import relief pol-
icy.98
Inadequate Staffing of the USTR and the Need to Redelegate
Responsibility
Those opposed to the Plan stress that the size of the USTR's office
will further undermine its ability to develop trade policy, handle the
full range of negotiations now assigned it, and oversee the implementa-
tion of both.99 Recent appropriations have authorized the enlargement
of the Office to a staff of 116, a doubling of its pre-Plan size.1" Despite
this increase, some in Congress still find that the staffing falls woefully
short of the number necessary for successful USTR operations.I10 The
staff could be increased if the USTR were removed from the Executive
Office of the President where political and budgetary constraints have
93 Donaldson Conversation, note 85 supra. The mechanics of TPC operation itself further
reduces the possibility of any Cabinet-level disagreements over trade policy. The TPC is sup-
ported by several tiers of staff groups. Directly below these groups is the Trade Policy Review
Group which is composed of the agencies' Assistant Secretaries. The group below them is the
Trade Policy Staff Committee, which is composed of Office Directors and viewed as the place
where most of the interagency coordination and policy development work takes place. This group
will often work in conjunction with the lowest tier, composed of task forces assigned to staffing a
particular issue. The STR chairs all tiers. Issues that cannot be resolved at the lowest level of
entry ascend through the tiers, with only the most important unresolved issues rising to TPC
Cabinet level. Id.
Luther Hodges, the newly appointed Deputy Secretary of Commerce, also believes that the
TPC will be free from any serious interagency disputes: "We all realize that the success of the
U.S. economy depends on the smooth operation of the Plan, and petty department jealousies have
no place here." Telephone conversation with Luther Hodges, Deputy Sec. of Commerce (Jan. 3,
1980).





99 Malmgren Conversation, note 76 supra.
100 Lamar Conversation, note 75 supra.
1o Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 113-14 (statement of Gills W. Long).
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kept the size low.102
The staff limitation inevitably requires that responsibility to other
departments for the briefing and negotiation of various trade issues
which the USTR has neither the time nor the expertise to handle on its
own be redelegated. For example, except in a few instances, commod-
ity policy primarily involves political rather than trade issues, and con-
cerns U.S. relations with the developing countries. Commodity
negotiations cover such items as coffee, sugar, and tin, and involve their
respective producing countries' proposals to develop international
agreements between the importing and exporting nations to provide
stability for the export earnings of these states. 10 3 Further, these nego-
tiations will often involve important foreign policy considerations in
the context of UNCTAD. As a result, the USTR can be expected to
redelegate to the Department of State, and to some extent, the Depart-
ment of Commerce, the task of policy orientation.1°4
Some see this need to redelegate as further undermining the viabil-
ity of the interagency coordinating process and leading to the contin-
ued fragmentation of responsibility and accountability.10 5 As William
Walker recalled from his past experience in STR:
[D]uring the MTN, STR had a staff of between 90 and 100. This was not
really enough to do the job properly since it forced STR to rely upon the
other agencies for basic research and the development of most positions.
The subcommittee is familiar with 'the tyranny of the first draft' and will
appreciate that there were many occasions in which departments could
deflect initiatives with which they disagreed by failing to staff them prop-
erly.106
It should be noted, however, that the STR will still maintain the
responsibility of overseeing the implementation of these issues, and can
always withdraw the delegated authority should the agency involved be
recalcitrant, indifferent, or ineffective in its handling of the assigned
trade issue.
The Inability of Commerce to PeiT/orm Its Trade Functions
There is general skepticism about the ability of the Department of
Commerce to effectively carry out its newly expanded responsibilities.
Commerce is a department with diverse missions, only one of which is
trade. It has been described as a "bureaucratic orphanage for stray
102 Id.
103 Lamar Conversation, note 75 supra.
104 Id.
105 Walker Testimony, note 73 supra.
106 Id.
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programs ranging from weather modification to fire prevention."107
The Administration takes exception to this view, feeling confident
that the Department's primary attention will now be focused on trade
issues as it assumes a broader role in this area.' °8 Several hundred va-
cant staff positions in Commerce were purposely left open in the areas
of trade and sectoral analysis so that there would be a major infusion of
new people. 10 9 Commerce's potential for success in its new trade role
appears strong given an augmented staff anxious to work in an area
with new visibility, prestige, and significance.
CONCLUSION
The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 is still in its infancy.
While some of the Plan's critics feel it did not go far enough in its
consolidation of U.S. trade functions, many more-including some of
those Congressmen who had previously advanced their own reorgani-
zation proposals-believe the Plan to be a significant initial effort to
shape a strong, rational, and consistent trade policy, one which will
allow the United States to negotiate with foreign governments from a
position of strength and to open new markets for U.S. exporters.
Despite the guarded optimism about the Plan in some quarters, it
is reasonable to expect the Plan to succeed in light of the clear leader-
ship role vested in the USTR to shape U.S. trade policy, and the new
strength given the Department of Commerce to implement it. A
healthy U.S. economy requires nothing less than the effective and effi-
cient development of trade policy and the vigorous implementation of
the MTN agreements.
Eliot B. Schreiber
107 Proposed Trade Hearings, supra note 7, at 130 (statement of William V. Roth). Further
doubt as to Commerce's ability to take on its new functions was voiced by Representative Gillis
Long, Co-Chairman of the Subcomm. on International Economics of the Joint Economic Comm.,
in his opening statement at his committee's hearing on trade reorganization: "Gentlemen, in Lou-
isiana we have a saying that, you don't buy a lazy hound for hunting. And I must say that Com-
merce looks a lot more like the possum than it does like the hound." Export Policy Hearings, note
22, supra (author's copy of statement of Gillis W. Long).
to8 Eric Hirschhorn, Director of the Trade Reorganization Study of the President's Reorgani-
zation Project, admits that this problem requires some further attention, though he believes that
Commerce has great potential to succeed in its new role, given the Department's new central trade
mission. Hirschhorn Conversation, note 61 supra.
109 Id.
